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CORRESPONDENCE

The Fantastic Wisconsylvania Zero-BureaucraticCost School of Bankruptcy Theory: A Comment
James W. Bowers*
We must beware of the pitfall of antiquarianism, and must remember that for our purposes our only interest in the past is for the
light it throws upon the present. I look forward to a time when the
part played by history in the explanation of dogma shall be very
small, and instead of ingenious research we shall spend our energy
on a study of the ends sought to be attained and the reasons for
desiring them. As a step toward that ideal it seems to me that every
lawyer ought to seek an understanding of economics. The present
divorce between the schools ofpolitical economy and law seems to
me an evidence of how much progress in philosophical study still
remains to be made.
- Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. 1

In two recently published articles, 2 Wisconsin Law Professor Lynn
LoPucki and Pennsylvania Law Professor Elizabeth Warren, nearly
simultaneously, fired the latest shots in one of academia's hottest
ongoing debates: whether any good reason for having bankruptcy law
exists. 3 Justice Holmes once opined that the future belonged to the
• Professor of Law, Louisiana State University Law Center. B.A. 1964, LL.B. 1967,
Yale. - Ed. My thanks to John Church and Lucy McGough for helpful comments on earlier
drafts. Credit for saving me from errors, but no blame for those remaining, is also due to Bob
Rasmussen and Bruce Markell. Lynn LoPucki and Elizabeth Warren also graciously suggested
improvements, some of which I made. They are obviously innocent of any sins that are left.
1. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 474 (1897).
2. Lynn M. LoPucki, Strange Visions in a Strange World: A Reply to Professors Bradley and
Rosenzweig, 91 MICH. L. REv. 79 (1992); Elizabeth Warren, The Untenable Case for Repeal of
Chapter 11, 102 YALE L.J. 437 (1992). The text identifies these authors with the institutions
with which they were affiliated at the time these articles were written. Professor LoPucki has
subsequently joined the faculty of Washington University in St. Louis, and Professor Warren has
joined the Harvard Law School faculty.
3. The current debate began with Thomas M. Jackson, Bankruptcy, Non-Bankruptcy Entitlements, and the Creditors' Bargain, 91 YALE L.J. 857 (1982) (arguing that state "grab-law" creditors' remedies were inefficient, and that creditors would therefore agree ex ante to a collective
remedy system resembling bankruptcy in order to overcome those inefficiencies). Douglas G.
Baird, The Uneasy Case for Corporate Reorganizations, 15 J. LEGAL STUD. 127 (1986), fired the
next salvo, arguing that the justification for bankruptcy law probably did not apply to publicly
traded companies. This work elevated the matter to the state of a recognized debate by provoking an exchange in the University of Chicago Law Review between Baird and Professor Elizabeth
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lawyer skilled in statistics and economics.4 LoPucki and Warren apparently agree about statistics but argue that, in a world with positive
transaction costs, economic theory has little to contribute to our understanding about the justifications for bankruptcy law.
I write to highlight what one might easily overlook in LoPucki's
and Warren's pieces. As they assail the usefulness of economic analysis, particularly analysis that begins by assuming zero transaction
costs, they simultaneously inaugurate a new analytic tradition: the
Fantastic Wisconsylvania School5 of Zero-Bureaucratic-Costs. They
use their new theory to argue that markets are costly and thus are of
limited or no use to people who want to take businesses apart or to
reconfigure them. Corporate reorganizations, they urge, require the
costless and perfectly functioning political appointee, the bankruptcy
judge. The birth of this jurisprudential school is too significant to be
permitted to pass unheralded.
I. THE BANKRUPTCY DEBATE: THEORY AND DATA

The bankruptcy debate, one of the few squabbles in academic commercial law ever to have hit the newspapers, 6 is over whether chapter
Warren. Compare Elizabeth Warren, Bankruptcy Policy, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 775 (1987) (arguing
that chapter 11 was intended to benefit workers and communities, and dismissing as irrelevant
that it might be shown, in economic theory, to be costly for shareholders and creditors) with
Douglas G. Baird, Loss Distribution, Forum Shopping, and Bankruptcy: A Reply to Warren, 54
U. CHI. L. R.Ev. 815 (1987) (arguing that arguments like Warren's were too atheoretical to be
helpful, and that bankruptcy should not be concerned with the redistributional policies favored
by Warren). After at least one partial symposium, Symposium on the Law and Economics of
Bargaining, 75 VA. L. R.Ev. 155 (1989), and several articles later in various journals, see, e.g.,
references cited infra notes 21 and 39, came a climactic point, at which the debate returned to the
Yale Law Journal: Michael Bradley & Michael Rosenzweig, The Untenable Case for Chapter JJ,
101 YALE L.J. 1043 (1992) (reporting an empirical study which claimed that the adoption of
chapter 11 in 1978 had increased the bankruptcy losses suffered by corporate shareholders, and
proposing that chapter 11 be repealed and replaced with a market system of contingent equity
contracts). It is this piece that was the subject of the Warren and LoPucki articles.
4. "For the rational study of law, the black-letter man may be the man of the present, but the
man of the future is the man of statistics and the master of economics." Holmes, supra note I, at
469. I am grateful to my erudite colleague Paul Baier for pointing out and then unearthing this
and the introductory Holmes reference for me.
5. Legal academia already boasts at least one famous "Wisconsin School," that of J. Willard
Hurst, who championed the application of social science methods to the study of legal history.
See Lawrence M. Friedman, American Legal History: Past and Present, in AMERICAN LAw AND
THE CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER 464, 465-67 (Lawrence M. Friedman & Harry N. Shieber eds.,
1988). It is thus propitious that Warren reached so nearly simultaneously conclusions similar to
LoPucki's, permitting their discovery to be named the Wisconsylvania School and eliminating
the potential for confusion that might have arisen between "Wisconsin Schools" had LoPucki
written alone.
6. See, for example, Lopucki, supra note 2, at 80 nn.5 & 6 for citations to numerous articles
in the financial press discussing the Bradley and Rosenzweig conclusions. Recently the debate
has reached the popular press as well, even the front page of the New York Times. Peter Passell,
Critics of Bankruptcy Law See Inefficiency and Waste, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 12, 1993, at Al.
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11 of the Bankruptcy Code is justifiable. Michael Bradley and
Michael Rosenzweig published an empirical study7 that compared the
stock market value declines in the securities of firms taking bankruptcy under chapters X and XI of the pre-1978 Bankruptcy Act regime8 with firms filing under the current chapter 11.9 The study was
limited to companies whose securities were traded on major stock exchanges because there are no easily available, reliable data on the market values of the securities of unlisted firms. 10 The study seems to
show that shareholders are much worse off under the current law than
under the former one.
LoPucki and Warren critically scrutinize this study. 11 LoPucki argues that the theoretical model into which Bradley and Rosenzweig fit
their data was inapposite because, among other things, it failed to discriminate between losses due to the Bankruptcy Code and ordinary
transaction costs incurred in recapitalizing businesses. 12 He and Warren also question Bradley and Rosenzweig's analysis, arguing that the
coming of the ·~unk bond" era made bankrupts in the two different
time periods impossible to compare for purposes of making statistical
inferences. 13 Warren further insinuates, but does not show, that there
7. Bradley & Rosenzweig, supra note 3.
8. The Chandler Act of 1938, ch. 575, 52 Stat. 840 (repealed 1978).
9. The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (codified as
amended at 11 U.S.C.A. §§ 101-1330 (West 1979 & Supp. 1992)).
10. Bradley & Rosenzweig, supra note 3, at 1058.
11. I too am critical of certain aspects of the Bradley and Rosenzweig study. On one important argument I agree with Warren and LoPucki that Bradley and Rosenzweig were unpersuasive. Bradley and Rosenzweig argue that the beneficiaries of chapter 11 were managers who were
able, because of chapter 11, to extract wealth from the shareholders and bondholders of their
firms. LoPucki and Warren analyze other studies on the fortunes of the managers of companies
that took chapter 11 and show that other data contradicts Bradley and Rosenzweig's conclusion.
See LoPucki, supra note 2, at 94-97; Warren, supra note 2, at 448-55. My shared criticism is
based on theoretical rather than empirical grounds. If chapter 11 tended to give managers new
ways of enriching themselves, and the market for management talent functioned minimally well,
then the adoption of chapter 11 should have caused a decline in other forms of executive compensation sufficient to make up for the new benefits chapter 11 confers on managers. Thus the
values of the securities of the filing companies would not necessarily be affected by the adoption
of chapter 11. I would therefore accept Bradley and Rosenzweig's conclusion that managers are
winners only after learning what sort of defect they posit must exist in the labor market for
managers which prevents such adjustments in executive wages.
My disagreement with them does not undercut the validity of their ultimate conclusion that
chapter 11 should be repealed. It may be that the losses they measure in their study are simply
the dissipation of value that occurs in classic rent seeking when chapter 11 blurs the boundaries
of everybody's property rights. See, for example, Anne O. Krueger, The Political Economy of the
Rent-Seeking Society, 64 AM. EcoN. REV. 291 (1974), and Gordon Tullock, The Welfare Cost of
Tariffs, Monopolies, and Theft, 5 W. EcoN. J. 224 (1967), for the seminal rent-seeking literature.
If rent seeking explains the losses, then nobody necessarily wins by the adoption of the new
chapter 11. The bottom-line conclusion that chapter 11 should be repealed, however, is not
undermined by a "nobody wins" thesis, even if a "managers win" thesis is partially discredited.
12. LoPucki, supra note 2, at 84 n.17.
13. Id. at 81; Warren, supra note 2, at 460-61.
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may be hidden biases in the samples used by Bradley and Rosenzweig
which make them nonrepresentative of the real world and cast doubt
on the validity of the conclusions Bradley and Rosenzweig draw from
them.t 4 Because this part of LoPucki's and Warren's work does not
advance their revolutionary new theory of zero-bureaucratic-costs, I
will leave to Bradley and Rosenzweig the defense of their empirical
model and statistical technique. ts
LoPucki and Warren make three principal theoretical criticisms of
the Bradley and Rosenzweig analysis which do invoke their new
theory:
1.

The first, argued by LoPucki alone, is that the Bradley and Rosenzweig data, strictly speaking, only justify replacing chapter 11
with chapters X and XI of the Chandler Act; 16
2. The second, advocated by both, is that a showing of increased
bankruptcy losses for publicly listed firms does not justify a repeal
of the statute insofar as it applies to unlisted companies;t 7 and
3. Third, both argue that there are possible corporate stakeholders
whose gains might outweigh the losses chapter 11 imposes on
stockholders and bondholders.ts If so, one cannot justify repeal of
chapter 11 by showing losses to those holding claims listed on
public exchanges unless one can also show that the gains to these
other, unexamined· stakeholders were less than the losses.
In light of these observations, LoPucki concludes that Bradley and
Rosenzweig's proposal to replace chapter 11 with a market system is
not based on their empirical findings, but rather on their economic
analysis of bankruptcy.t 9 According to LoPucki, however, economic
14. See, e.g., Warren, supra note 2, at 455-59.
15. Bradley and Rosenzweig give a summary defense of their technique in Michael Bradley
& Michael Rosenzweig, The Still Untenable Case for Chapter 11 (1993) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the author). To deal with the claim that the chapter 11 firms were ·~unk
bond" issuers unlike the chapter X and XI firms, and thus were systematically more highly
leveraged, Bradley and Rosenzweig reran their comparisons on an even larger sample, holding
leverage constant in their comparisons of pre- and post-1978 filing firms, and arrived at identical
conclusions.
16. LoPucki, supra note 2, at 97 n.66.
17. Id.; Warren, supra note 2, at 444-46.
18. LoPucki hypothesizes that creditors other than bondholders gain as much as the holders
of those publicly traded claims lose. LoPucki, supra note 2, at 83 n.14, 94. Warren argues that
chapter 11 was intended to redistribute debtors' wealth to multiple other parties. Warren, supra
note 2, at 467-71. Since the claims of those other parties and creditors do not trade in active
markets, however, this hypothesis is likely to be nearly untestable. Even if true, therefore, its
truth must be accepted as a matter of faith.
19. "It is on the basis of their nonempirical economic analysis that they conclude that courtsupervised bankruptcy reorganization should be eliminated entirely." LoPucki, supra note 2, at
97-98. Warren would probably not disagree because she argues that the Bradley and Rosenzweig
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analysis can never give meaningful, or even interesting,20 insights in
the real world. He therefore concludes that the Bradley and Rosenzweig argument, lacking both empirical and theoretical support, is utterly unfounded. Warren argues similarly that chapter 11 was
adopted to replace market transactions because the use of markets entails high costs. 21 In the drawing of this conclusion and in its elaboration, LoPucki and Warren inaugurate their revolutionary mode of
analysis. Since the three critiques are pregnant with the tenets of the
new Wisconsylvania School, it will be useful to examine them a bit
more closely.
A.

The Pull of Positivism

The Bradley and Rosenzweig study shows that a regime in which
bankruptcy relief is easy to obtain creates more losses than a regime in
which such relief is harder to obtain. 22 Technically, Bradley and Rosenzweig admit, the direct conclusion to be drawn from this finding is
that the current law ought to be repealed in favor of the former law. 23
However, making bankruptcy relief easier to obtain seems to increase
conclusions should be limited to the cases they studied, which were all cases of listed companies.
Warren, supra note 2, at 440.
20. "Bradley & Rosenzweig's economic analysis of bankruptcy reorganization tells us more
about economic analysis than about bankruptcy. The way problems melt away in this PM-ZTC
[Perfect Markets-Zero Transaction Costs] World seems at first elegant, then suspicious, and finally boring." LoPucki, supra note 2, at 106. Strictly speaking, he may assume that there are
several subsects of economic analysis and find boring only the sect which uses the concept of zero
transaction costs as an analytical tool. LoPucki's work has nevertheless been consistently suspicious of whether economic arguments can ever advance our understanding, whether or not such
arguments were explicitly based on zero-transaction-cost models. See, e.g., Lynn M. LoPucki &
William C. Whitford, Bargaining over Equity's Share in the Bankruptcy Reorganization ofLarge,
Publicly Held Companies, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 125, 183 (1990) (arguing that an a priori economic
model of bankruptcy "cannot establish factually what the most efficient rule governing distributions in bankruptcy would be"). Warren has been critical of the contributions of economic analysis in the bankruptcy field before. See Warren, supra note 3. In the piece discussed in this
correspondence, however, she limits her theoretical critique to an expression of skepticism over
whether analyses which assume zero transaction costs are valid in a real world where such costs
are positive. Warren, supra note 2, at 474-77.
21. Warren, supra note 2, at 474-77. She does not address the theoretical reasons for believ-"
ing that market systems encourage and permit institutions and behaviors that lower transaction
costs and thus tend to produce optimally low-transaction-cost interactions among people. See,
e.g., infra section 11.B. I have made this argument explicitly in connection with the nonbankruptcy law of creditors' remedies, showing that when investment in cost-saving technology is
necessary in order to reduce transaction costs, the incentives generated by the nonbankruptcy
creditors' remedy system are most apt to induce the appropriate investment. James W. Bowers,

Whither What Hits the Fan?: Murphy's Law, Bankruptcy Theory, and the Elementary Economics
of Lass Distribution, 26 GA. L. REV. 27, 46-51 (1991).
22. The primary effects of the new law are to make it easier for firms to seek bankruptcy
relief and to consolidate the postbankruptcy control of the firm's management in the face of
competing claims of creditors for the right to control the bankrupt firm's fortunes. See Bradley
& Rosenzweig, supra note 3, at 1048.
23. Id. at 1077 n.80.
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bankruptcy losses, a fact from which one might also infer that chapter
11 ought to be repealed entirely. The process of inference employed to
arrive at this last conclusion is not, at least obviously, based on any
economic analysis. It is as simple as drawing the following common
sense conclusions:
1.

Premise: Less unpleasant states of the world are preferable to

more unpleasant states.
2. Data: I hate a regime in which you stick needles into my body for
ten minutes more than one in which you stick them in for only
two minutes.
3. Strict Empirical Observation: The two-minute needle state of the
world is better than the ten-minute state.
4. Extended Inference: The best of all worlds is probably neither the
two- nor the ten-minute state, but instead a third one in which you
do not stick needles into me at all.
LoPucki's first argument24 relies on the proposition that by itself data
supports only a strict empirical observation but will not support any
extended inferences so that, if you draw them, their source has to be
some entirely extraneous theory. 25 For his argument and my acupuncture hypothetical, we have trend data on only two regimes from
which we drew a conclusion about a yet-to-be experienced third regime. 26 Perhaps it is an inherent weakness in legal argument that lawyers would recognize and even approve of this process of reasoning. It
is probably true that many of Bradley and Rosenzweig's readers understood and agreed with this process of reasoning as a valid exercise
in the drawing of inferences. True, it would be better to have had
strict empirical observations of my actual preferences about the third
regime prior to arriving at the extended inference. 27 That there could
be stronger empirical support for that inference is not, however, the
same as saying that there is no support for it in the data.
It is very difficult to obtain data which support strict empirical
24. See supra text accompanying note 16.
25. After reviewing a draft of this comment, LoPucki with great charm advised me that he is
not skeptical of all possible extended inferences which would be drawn from Bradley and Rosen·
zweig's data, but only of those that tend to undermine the justification for chapter 11. He enthu·
siastically endorses any that tend to vindicate chapter 11. Indeed, as he pointed out to me, he has
argued for at least three other interpretations of the data, each of which he considers to be a more
plausible inference than that drawn by Bradley and Rosenzweig. LoPucki, supra note 2, at 94.
26. By treating his argument skeptically, I do not mean to suggest that the extended infer·
ence is not implied by the initial premise; the inference is heavily dependent on the theory em·
bodied in that premise. I do contend, however, that the ultimate conclusion is, in common sense,
also implied by the data.
27. To negate, for example, the possibility that I have a minor masochistic preference for
being poked with needles but only for time periods shorter than two minutes.
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observations about prospective future states of affairs that have never
existed. To demand that legal conclusions be based only on what can
be proven by strict empirical observation, as LoPucki apparently does,
is to carry the demands of positivistic methodology to an untenable
extreme. Applying such standards creates large gaps between what we
think we can know confidently and what we can actually know from
proof. Among other things, the requirement outlaws all aspirational
reasoning processes unless one aspires to some golden age in the past
about which data might hypothetically be available. Those who aspire
to futures that do not duplicate some golden era hold unjustifiable aspirations if only conclusions based on strict empirical observation
alone can be justified.
Not so "strictly speaking," we can draw the inference that Bradley
and Rosenzweig drew without resort to any theory other than one
which holds that regimes in which costs are low are preferable to regimes in which costs are high. Indeed, I show below that the Fantastic Wisconsylvania Zero-Bureaucratic-Cost Model that drives the
LoPucki and Warren critiques relies on this same preference hypothesis. It might thus be argued that the Bradley and Rosenzweig conclusion, insofar as it cannot be inferred directly from their data, is based
on LoPucki's and Warren's hierarchy of values instead. It is doubtful
that many of the arguments of any defender of chapter 11, including
those of LoPucki and Warren, pass the test of being based only upon
strict empirical observations.
B. Stakeholders and Close Corporations: Markets and Values

The second and third arguments that both Warren and LoPucki
make are especially curious in light of LoPucki's first one. If one may
not form valid conclusions from anything other than strict empirical
observations of facts, LoPucki cannot know anything about the market values of closely held corporations because nobody has reliable
data about the value of claims to the assets of such firms. It follows
that he can say to Bradley and Rosenzweig, "you do not know." He
cannot say, "you are wrong."
In the absence of empirical information about close corporations,
whether Bradley and Rosenzweig can appropriately draw inferences
about close corporations from data on publicly traded firms depends
on whether extended inferences from empirical data are ever permissible and, if so, when. Answering these questions requires dealing critically with the differences between the anticipated behavior of
financially troubled small businessmen, as opposed to big businessmen,
in responding to the existence of creditors. Adoption of the strict em-
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pirical observation test is a slick way for LoPucki to relieve himself of
the need to do this analysis. 28 Similarly, without explicit data permitting strict empirical observations, LoPucki cannot ever know whether
other stakeholders such as nonbondholding creditors have gained or
lost welfare as a result of the passage of chapter 11, and thus cannot
validly criticize Bradley and Rosenzweig for ignoring them either.
The difficulty is not only in the extent of our present knowledge,
however. It is apparently LoPucki's position that whether chapter 11
is justifiable is inevitably unknowable. Bradley and Rosenzweig are
quite explicit that their study limited itself to companies whose securities were listed on major stock exchanges because hard information on
market values was available only for those companies. 29 The strict
empirical observation limitation means that the impact of chapter 11
on closely held corporations and on stakeholders whose claims do not
trade in markets can never be knowable. 30 It will thus never be possible either to justify the application of bankruptcy or to justify its repeal as it applies to such corporations or stakeholders unless either
justification comes from a theory. This realization, when combined
with LoPucki's succeeding argument in favor of having chapter 11 apply to close corporations and other stakeholders, leads to the insight
that he is ignoring his own strict empirical observation restriction by
employing a theory based on extended inference himself. That insight
prompts this attempt to unearth the principles of his theory.

28. Warren, on the other hand, lays out a taxonomy of differences that exist between listed
and unlisted firms and then asserts that the existence of these differences "casts serious doubt on
Bradley and Rosenzweig's claim that their data apply with equal force to all corporations."
Warren, supra note 2, at 442-43. This stops just short of saying that nothing we know about
listed corporations can ever serve as a basis for an extended inference about corporations generally, a position that comes close to insisting on strict empirical observation rigor. However, the
tone of Warren's critique suggests that she might even be willing to infer that chapter 11 makes
stockholders of close corporations better off from the fact that it makes holders of listed shares
worse off because the types of firms are so different. Id. at 443. This position finesses the problem nearly as effectively as LoPucki's strict empirical observation requirement but, because it is
itself an extended inference, also violates that requirement and thus makes ambiguous the extent
to which Warren subscribes to LoPucki's standard of observational strictness.
29. Bradley & Rosenzweig, supra note 3, at 1056 n.44.
30. Recall that Bradley and Rosenzweig's argument and inference is that the adoption of
chapter 11 caused the market values of certain claims against bankrupt firms to decline. Market
values are direct evidence of the worth placed on rights to assets by actual, living buyers and
sellers. There is much in LoPucki's argument, however, to suggest that he deems irrelevant what
actual people are willing to take for or pay for rights. Instead, he suggests that the relevant
datum is some transcendental sort of pure value. For example, LoPucki suggests that market
values might somehow be incorrect, and that markets might "overvalue" corporate shares.
LoPucki, supra note 2, at 83 n.13. At the same time, however, he also suggests that the problem
of determining nonmarket values is intractable. Id. at 84 & n.18.
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II.

MARKETS

AND BUREAUCRACIES

A. Aspirations and Economic Models

The meat of the Warren and LoPucki commentary on the Bradley
and Rosenzweig study is their attack on economic theory, upon which
LoPucki and Warren claim Bradley and Rosenzweig's conclusions
must have been based. 31 The problem, LoPucki asserts, is "the economist's hypothetical world of perfect markets and zero transaction costs
... the PM-ZTC World. " 32 LoPucki and Warren both argue that the
distance between this assumed world and the real world in which we
live is so great that conclusions about the former are simply irrelevant
to the lives of people living in the latter. 33 This argument flies in the
face of a long human tradition of insisting that good can come from
contemplating heaven, if for no other reason than to better the odds
that we can get there.
The LoPucki and Warren dismissal of the observation technique of
economic analysis, presumably to be replaced by strict information
about the real world, marks them as adherents to what Holmes called
"antiquarianism."34 LoPucki and Warren reject, and Bradley and Ro31. See supra note 19. If the Bradley and Rosenzweig proposals are as unrelated to their
empirical work and as dependent upon their economic theory, as LoPucki and Warren argue,
one might wonder why they spent so much energy criticizing Bradley and Rosenzweig's empirical technique. If they believe that the Bradley and Rosenzweig theory is required to reach their
conclusions and that it is indefensible, their empirical critiques were a waste of time. The empirical critiques also tend, unfortunately, to divert our focus from LoPucki's and Warren's own
theoretical contributions to the debate.
32. LoPucki, supra note 2, at 99. Actually, his characterization of the hypothetical world
economic analysts use is potentially redundant. If the set of costs considered to be transaction
costs is defined broadly enough, ZTC alone is all it is necessary to assume. The existence of
universal and utterly perfect markets follows from the assumption of. ZTC. See generally Guido
Calabresi, Transaction Costs, Resource Allocation and Liability Rules - A Comment, 11 J.L. &
EcoN. 67 (1968). If transaction costs are more narrowly defined, recent work in game theory
suggests that ZTC may not inevitably lead to perfect market outcomes. See, e.g., Jason S. Johnston, Opting In and Opting Out: Bargaining far Fiduciary Duties in Cooperative Ventures, 70
WASH. U. L.Q. 291 (1992).
33. As yet, no one has demonstrated that any relationship at all exists between the way
things work in the PM-ZTC World and the way things work in the world in which we live.
No basis exists for assuming that, because a proposition is entirely true in the former world,
it is even a little bit true in the latter. To prove a necessary premise of an argument false is
to defeat the argument. By that standard, all arguments that depend on PM-ZTC assumptions fail, as do all attempts to import conclusions from the PM-ZTC world.
LoPucki, supra note 2, at 109. "Unfortunately, we live in an imperfect world. Economists have
long recognized that solutions proposed for perfect markets may not work in imperfect markets."
Warren, supra note 2, at 474.
34. See supra note 1. Taken together with his insistence that conclusions be based only on
strict empirical observation, LoPucki argues that the only sound basis for making policy judgments is valid empirical data. Warren too has fervently insisted that all bankruptcy arguments
must be based on solid empirical data. See, e.g., Teresa A. Sullivan et al., The Use of Empirical
Data in Formulating Bankruptcy Policy, LAW & CoNTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1987, at 195. These
positions are "antiquarian" because data are always explicitly historical.
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senzweig accept, Holmes' call for us to "spend our energy on a study
of the ends sought to be attained and the reasons for desiring them." 35
The Coase Theorem, 36 application of which inaugurated the use of
ZTC models, posits the ZTC world as one of aspiration. The ZTC
world is the one in which the most is made out of the world's scarce
resources. In all other worlds, scarce resources might be wasted while
. some people are still hungry. In their model Bradley and Rosenzweig
propose that the law be altered to mimic more closely the outcomes in
a ZTC world. LoPucki and Warren, however, reject as nonsensical
the use of a ZTC world even as an aspiration. 37 This is particularly
ironic because it appears that, upon close examination of their argument, LoPucki and Warren seem devoted to the lowering of transaction costs as justification for their own legal arguments. 38 What is
significant and important about their analysis, and promising about
the Fantastic Wisconsylvania School of Zero-Bureaucratic-Costs
(ZBC), is that defenders of the Bankruptcy Code have, for the first
time, offered a coherent principle to justify its existence. If bankruptcy
law lowers transaction costs, it has a lot going for it that has never
been previously realized. 39 Regrettably, neither LoPucki's nor Warren's application of the ZBC model takes serious analytical account of
transaction costs.

35. See supra note 1.
36. See Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & EcoN. 1 (1960).
37. See supra note 33. ZTC models are "boring" to LoPucki because, in a world of ZTC,
every new proposal does maximize wealth. See LoPucki, supra note 20. LoPucki's boredom,
however, results from a misapplication of the Coase Theorem. The theorem actually suggests
that things tum out right only when the parties have the right to contract around any imperfec·
tions. Inasmuch as he acknowledges that the right to take chapter 11 cannot be contracted
around, LoPucki, supra note 2, at 107 n.123, an actual world of very low or nonexistent transaction costs ought still to retain some intrinsically interesting legal problems.
38. "Chapter 11 exists solely to deal with transaction costs." LoPucki, supra note 2, at 106.
"Bradley and Rosenzweig argue that bankruptcy is justifiable only if there are problems generated by 'significant .•. transactions costs' .... In my view, Chapter 11 was specifically designed
to respond to such problems." Warren, supra note 2, at 475.
One way of making the world mimic one in which costs are zero is, of course, to alter the
existing world in ways that reduce costs as near to zero as is practical.
39. Warren explicitly uses the argument that bankruptcy lowers transaction costs. Warren,
supra note 2, at 475.
My own work expresses some skepticism that transaction costs can justify or explain the
existence of bankruptcy, although I do try to explain the existence and shape of nonbankruptcy
creditors' remedies as functions of the existence of transaction costs. James W. Bowers, Groping

and Coping in the Shadow of Murphy's Law: Bankruptcy Theory and the Elementary Economics
ofFailure, 88 MICH. L. REV. 2097 (1990) (arguing that debtors are the most efficient liquidators
of their own declining affairs even in the presence of identified transaction costs); Bowers, supra
note 21 (arguing that debtors are the most efficient distributors of their own assets, even in the
face of identified transaction costs).
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The Transaction Costs Avoided by Bankruptcies

The heart of LoPucki's argument is not a systematic attempt to
discredit economic reasoning, but rather an argument by example. He
posits that there are four types of transaction costs in the real world
which are ignored by Bradley and Rosenzweig's proposal to jettison
chapter 11. While he never explicitly says so, it is apparent that, in the
end, LoPucki must make his own "economic" analysis and base it
firmly on the second classic model which earned Coase the Nobel
Prize. 40 If the market fails to be efficient, Coase argued, a commandtype governance structure could be justified, assuming that the costs
imposed by failures inherent in command structures are not more serious than those imposed by failures of the market. 41 LoPucki never
even asks whether, in order to defend bankruptcy law, one must do
anything more than assert that the world has transaction costs.
Rather than face the question of whether bankruptcy has costs of its
own that might exceed the market's transaction costs, he has taken the
easier route of assuming that command structures entail zero bureaucratic costs. Thus, if one can demonstrate that markets impose transaction costs on people, one can easily justify chapter 11 because,
unlike markets, it operates perfectly and costlessly. Voila ZBC!
Warren's view may not be quite as extreme. She only suggests that
bankruptcy provides certain functions at lower cost than state courts
or markets. 42 She gives us nothing except her own unvarnished opinion to support her suggestions, however. Analytically, an undefended
assumption of low bureaucratic costs is so nearly the equivalent of a
zero-bureaucratic-cost assumption that Warren deserves credit as
codiscoverer of ZBC analysis. 43
40. Ronald H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 EcoNOMICA 386 (1937) (explaining the
existence of firms by the fact that coordination of activities in markets via contracts incurs excessive transaction costs). The suggestion that bankruptcy could be seen as the mandatory creation
of a firm with a management (trustee) and various owners (claimants) is, to my knowledge,
originally my thought, not LoPucki's. See Bowers, supra note 39, at 2109.
41. Cf. Guido Calabresi, The Pointlessness ofPareto: Carrying Coase Further, 100 YALE L.J.
1211, 1213-15 (1991) (explaining Coase's view of the symmetry between market and command
structures).
42. Warren, supra note 2, at 475-77.
43. If either Warren or LoPucki had less disdain for economic theory, they might not have
overlooked an obvious and simple theoretical argument for the assumption that chapter 11 involves lower transaction costs than market activity would. Debtors always have the option of
trying to work out and solve their problems in markets. To the extent that markets are cheaper
than chapter 11, then, profit-maximizing debtors will avail themselves of market solutions. Assuming, as is typical in economic argument, that for any input like market restructuring activity
the marginal costs are increasing, one might predict that debtors will use markets to solve their
illiquidity problems until the marginal cost of additional efforts in the market exceed the marginal costs of employing chapter 11. Thus, voluntary chapter 1ls will occur only when they are
cheaper than alternative market-based solutions to the debtor's problems. Because the market is
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The Bradley and Rosenzweig study is so troubling to LoPucki and
Warren because Bradley and Rosenzweig's empirical data tend to call
the ZBC assumption into question. Indeed, for publicly listed firms,
their data supports the strict empirical observation that chapter 11
does not operate with ZBC, at least as far as investors are concerned.
LoPucki's transaction cost analysis, on the other hand, is not
grounded on strict empirical observation, nor even on extended inference, but rather upon casual theorizing about the operation of markets. The transaction costs (market failures) LoPucki identifies which,
along with an implicit ZBC assumption, he asserts justify the existence
of chapter 11 are discussed in tum below.
1.

The Problem of !!liquidity

The market-based alternative to chapter 11 proposed by Bradley
and Rosenzweig# assumes that debtors in financial trouble can raise
new capital in the market either by selling equity claims or by liquidating assets. LoPucki points out that it is costly to identify and assemble
all the world's potential buyers, who are ready to make their best
deals, at one place and one time so that whatever the debtor sells will
bring in its highest values. Instead, it is cheaper to permit bidders to
present themselves and assess potential deals with the debtor serially,
over time, until a satisfactory bid is received. 45 A market-based alternative, then, will fail because, in the real world, debtors will not have
enough time between default and foreclosure to access the serially appearing buyer market. Auctions tend to bring fire-sale, distressed
prices. LoPucki argues that chapter 11 buys time, thus overcoming
this market failure, and is therefore economically justifiable. 46 The aralways available as a choice for management, the chapter 1ls that actually occur will only be in
cases in which command techniques cost less than market techniques; the world should never be
troubled with chapter 1ls in which the contrary is the case. But see Alan Schwartz, Bankruptcy
Workouts and Debt Contracts, 36 J.L. & EcoN. (forthcoming 1993) (arguing that market work·
outs are likely to fail only when debtor firms or their managements insist on retaining more than
the amount of gains resulting from the workout contract; that is, they make offers to creditors
that will pay less than the amount to which creditors are legally entitled and can reasonably
expect to receive absent a workout agreement; and concluding that commercial firms ought to be
permitted to waive the protection of bankruptcy law).
44. And the optimal liquidation scheme proposed by me as well. See Bowers, supra note 39.
45. A transaction-cost analysis of this type may explain why, for example, people typically
list real estate with brokers and sell it over a period of a few months rather than holding auctions.
LoPucki does not give us any information about whether debtors-in-possession (DIPs) under
chapter 11 ever decide either to list with brokers or to hold auctions, however. He simply assumes that these two costly "market-based" techniques, used by all of us outside bankruptcy, are
somehow cheaper or even costless when employed within a bankruptcy proceeding by a trustee
or DIP.
46. LoPucki, supra note 2, at 100-01. Warren seems to agree that she argues that, to the
extent the acts necessary to obtain liquidity are out of the "ordinary," bankruptcy is intended to
see that such acts be taken only under close court and creditor supervision. Warren, supra note
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gument is valid, however, only if one assumes that the command
structure proceedings which replace these otherwise costly market
transactions are themselves costless, or, as Warren is more explicit in
suggesting, less costly than the market alternative. Thus, by making
this argument, LoPucki implicitly adopts the Zero-Bureaucratic-Cost
assumption.
His analysis makes some other illegitimate, implicit assumptions
about the market-based proposal offered by Bradley and Rosenzweig.
LoPucki implicitly assumes that the techniques required for dealing
with financial distress must all be employed over a very tight
timeframe. 47 In Bradley and Rosenzweig's view, on the other hand,
financial distress is endogenous - chosen by management. It would
be avoidable if management constantly accessed the market, perhaps
years in advance of any financial downturn in the firm's fortunes, so
that fire-sale time constraints would never have to be faced. 48 If corporate managers carry out that function, they could buy and hold puts
covering the firm's assets years before any financial crisis created illiquidity.49 Managers offered chapter 11 as an alternative to buying
puts on the firm's assets may not buy them, however. Thus, the managers themselves create the crises that require auctions instead of serially appearing buyer-market sales.
One might object that puts for corporate assets are nearly as illiq2, at 475. There is some theoretical reason to conclude that illiquidity problems are not based
exclusively on transaction costs, however. Bruce A. Markell, The Case Against Breakup Fees in
Bankruptcy, 66 AM. BANKR. L.J. 349, 367-68 (1992), argues that the desire to maximize revenues can also explain the choice of an auction technique, so that illiquidity need not result exclusively from market failure.
47. LoPucki, supra note 2, at 100.
48. Bradley & Rosenzweig, supra note 3, at 1047, 1087-88.
49. Buying puts is not, of course, the only management strategy available in a market-based
alternative regime to chapter 11. Management could obtain similar protection by lining up longterm contingent lines of credit or simply by holding much of the firm's asset base in the form of
liquid assets. In some markets, such as the market for cash, the hypothesis that transactions are
costless is nearly true. In fact, the existence of one well-functioning market, like the market for
cash, makes it possible for debtors to minimize their losses even when the remainder of their
assets are traded only in costly markets. See Bowers, supra note 39, at 2129.
Still another alternative way in which a market might deal with this problem is in the negotiation of the debt contract ab initio. If the essential justification for chapter 11 is the need for a
grace period for all debtors so that they can use the time-accessed market, debtors could bargain
for grace periods in their debt contracts. Bankruptcy treats all debtors as if they need grace, and
probably similar periods of it. The market, however, is likely to discriminate between those
borrowers who need a lot of grace - and who would therefore offer to pay for the right to grace
- and those whose assets would ordinarily be liquid anyway - and who do not have such
critical needs for grace or whose needs are likely to be for shorter periods. The latter group is
likely to bargain and pay for somewhat less grace. The bureaucratic chapter 11 solution, however, is likely to treat all these borrowers alike and thus to require some to pay for more grace
than they really need while delivering less than they really need and are willing to pay for to
others. That is a bureaucratic cost whose existence the Wisconsylvania school apparently denies
or assumes to be trivially minimal.

1786

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 91:1773

uid as the assets themselves, thus necessitating a bureaucratic solution
such as chapter 11. However, the fact that there is no established market for puts for lots of corporate assets may be a result of the existence
of chapter 11 rather than a justification for it. Markets tend to arise
when there are needs to be served and money can be made in serving
them. so There is thus reason to believe that repeal of chapter 11 would
create markets through which the transaction cost of illiquidity could
potentially be avoided. Similarly, established markets for options on
many firms' securities already exist. Repeal of chapter 11 might cause
them to function somewhat more actively than they do now.
Nevertheless, LoPucki would undoubtedly say, the investment in
puts would divert corporate resources from their current uses, and
thus would not be costless, transactionally speaking. He would, of
course, be correct, but the argument would not end there. The issue
then would be: Is chapter 11 cheaper than the cost of buying the puts?
If it were, then management would not buy them, opting instead for
chapter 11. The key defect in the current Bankruptcy Code is that, if
the converse is true, the debtor cannot contract out of the chapter 11
method of dealing with the timing problem and into the cheaper putbuying technique for doing so. Of course, this is not a serious argument to a believer in the Fantastic Wisconsylvania School, which assumes that chapter 11 is always the low-cost alternative.
The point here is that both Bradley and Rosenzweig and Warren
and LoPucki can be right. They differ only in their estimation of the
costs of reorganizing businesses. To the extent that neither markets
nor bureaucracies function costlessly, both Bradley and Rosenzweig
and Warren and LoPucki carry their arguments too far. In cases of
doubt, probably the best solution is to permit firms to choose which
regime they feel is least costly. Firms that believe LoPucki and Warren will then opt for bankruptcies; firms that believe Bradley and Rosenzweig will choose the market-based solution. LoPucki and Warren
are thus right that there is no need to adopt Bradley and Rosenzweig's
solution of repealing chapter 11. All that is necessary is to amend
chapter 11 so that debtors can contract out of its provisions. 51

50. Indeed, chapter 11 itself spawned new markets for interests in distressed firms. See, e.g.,
Scott K. Charles, Trading Claims in Chapter 11 Cases: Legal Issues Confronting the Postpetitlon
Investor, 1991 ANN. SURV. OF AM. L. 261, 261-63.
51. For such a proposal, see Robert K. Rasmussen, Debtor's Choice: A Menu Approach to
Corporate Bankruptcy, 71 TEXAS L. REv. 51 (1992).
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Communication and Coordination

a. Communications among a multitude of parties. LoPucki's
second identified market failure is that, because there are likely to be
many thousands of claimants with rights against the firm, transaction
costs to adjust the affairs of all these claimants are likely to be high
unless one assumes them away by positing a zero-transaction-cost
world. 52 Furthermore, even worse than having too many claimants
might be having too few. When as few as two parties must get together and negotiate, bilateral monopoly problems impose still more
transaction costs. To avoid these difficulties, chapter 11 is justifiable,
LoPucki argues. 53
It is a common belief at the bar that one purpose of chapter 11 is to
force negotiations among the throngs of people in a doomsday setting. 54 It is not obvious, however, why suddenly placing all this bargaining under the mantle of chapter 11 suddenly renders it costless. 55
If management remained liquid enough, which could be done in markets as suggested above, the hundreds of simultaneous negotiations
would not have to take place in the expensive fashion that LoPucki
suggests the market imposes. Everybody's property rights would not
have to be redetermined at once. Instead, only the property rights of
those involved in the lowest priority at any time need be involved in
the renegotiations. 5 6
There are additional reasons to believe that the market offers managements techniques for lowering coordination costs. For example,
lender syndicates who offer to deal through a single representative
52. "Direct negotiations among so many parties are unthinkable." LoPucki, supra note 2, at
101-02. "[Chapter 11] provides a forum for negotiating deals ... [which] help[s] to reduce
transaction costs •.. that exist in the real world between a troubled company and the thousands
of entities with which it conducts its business." Warren, supra note 2, at 475.
53. See LoPucki, supra note 2, at 102 n.87: "Chapter 11 would be necessary to impose on
irrational parties the deals they should have made."
54. See, e.g., J. Bradley Johnston, The Bankruptcy Bargain, 65 AM. BANKR. L.J. 213, 229-41
(1991); Donald R. Korobkin, Rehabilitating Values: A Jurisprudence ofBankruptcy, 91 COLUM.
L. REV. 717, 775 (1991).
55. LoPucki explains that, under chapter 11, bargainers are forced to bargain in large, intermediated groups. LoPucki, supra note 2, at 101. This cuts down the number of bargains that
must be struck, but it still remains unclear why or to what extent it is cheaper to make people
bargain through agents they did not want to appoint than to let the market mediate. If increasing the amount of bargaining was a goal of the 1978 Bankruptcy Act revisions, then Bradley and
Rosenzweig's data allows us to make the strict empirical observation that bargaining through
involuntary agents is not the least costly way to do it as far as investors are concerned.
56. LoPucki has recently argued that uncertainty about the value of the insolvent firm is
normally sufficiently large to cut across more than one legal priority level. Lynn M. LoPucki &
William C. Whitford, Corporate Governance in the Bankruptcy Reorganization ofLarge, Publicly
Held Companies, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 669, 771-76 (1993). If the value uncertainties cannot be
resolved in debt contracts, it would follow that renegotiation might have to occur with the bottom priorities rather than the bottom priority.
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would offer competitive advantages to syndicate members over other
lenders who insisted on dealing individually. Debt contracts could
then be struck in a market-based alternative to chapter 11 in ways that
minimize these coordination costs.
In a world that still has a nonwaivable chapter 11, however, the
competitive advantage of lenders who join in syndicates is nullified.
Lenders in such a world will deal with debtors on an individual basis;
thus, individual lenders, not syndicates, will be found in whatever
chapter 1ls are brought. If lenders deal individually, the costs of negotiation are raised in the chapter 1ls by the costs of forcing the individual claimants to deal through representatives different from those
they would have contractually selected. The existence of loan participations and indenture trustees for bond issues is some evidence that
the market is sensitive to, and capable of taking steps to reduce, coordination and negotiation costs. The existence of such costs does not
imply that the market solution is inferior to the bureaucratic solution
unless the ZBC assumption is somehow more justifiable than the ZTC
assumption.

b. Coordination among a multitude of substantive rights. Perhaps, as LoPucki suggests, property rights might arise by contract
with debtor firms which conflict with each other. I suppose it also
sometimes happens that the descriptions of dairy farm boundaries get
fouled up in Wisconsin so that occasionally two farmers both believe
they own that same strip along the back road. By and large, it is probably a fair guess that the market contract system, under which farms
are bought, sold, mortgaged, and so forth, does a pretty good job of
coordinating old MacDonald's boundary line with Farmer Brown's.
It is far from obvious, however, whether a chapter 11, which brings
the two farmers and all their uncles and cousins into litigation with
each other, is necessary to resolve boundary disputes, something
nonbankruptcy courts have _been doing for some time now. On the
other hand, if bankruptcy courts can resolve boundary disputes at zero
costs, perhaps they ought to be reconstituted into central economic
planning agencies. Because they operate costlessly, by LoPucki's and
Warren's lights, they might be justified as necessary to coordinate everybody's property rights all of the time.
3.

Relieffrom Contractual Default Provisions

Unlike the problem of serially time-accessed markets and the problem of coordination and negotiation, this function supposedly served
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by chapter 11 57 does not involve avoidance of transaction costs.
Rather, the blurring of rights that occurs when courts do not decide in
advance which contract clauses to enforce and which not to enforce
creates transaction costs. However, if there are weaknesses in the
common law of contract that lead us to believe that the courts should
not enforce draconian default clauses, the solution is not to add to the
number of preexisting transaction costs out there in the world.
Rather, it is to propose and adopt a federal law of contract that will
override the inefficient state doctrines that enforce those draconian
clauses. Achieving this solution, however, requires a theory to distinguish between worthwhile default clauses and objectionable ones.
It is questionable whether bankruptcy law is a rational response to
an imperfection in a small part of the common law of contract that
permits objectionable default clauses to be enforced. LoPucki has not
even suggested that a theory which sorts good default clauses from
bad ones has emerged in the bankruptcy process. Since the theory has
not yet even been identified, it has not yet been defended. It is premature, in the absence of such a theory and its defense, to conclude that
contracts should not be enforced as they are negotiated, much less that
the adoption of chapter 11 is the best technique for applying the social
decision not to enforce them.
4. Soft Landings for Managers and Shareholders
LoPucki's final apology for chapter 11 is that it is needed to eliminate managers who are unwilling to be fired and shareholders who will
not admit that their interest in bankrupt firms has evaporated. In
making this assertion he does not identify what transaction costs prevent market adjustment of these contractual relationships, nor does he
specify the alternative sorts of extra costs that might be incurred if the
enforcement of market contracts replaced chapter 11 as a mechanism
for the removal of management and shareholders. 58 Because LoPucki
does not indicate the particular transaction costs that dictate a bureaucratic rather than a market-based solution to these problems, it is hard
to believe that he offers this argument seriously. 5 9
57. LoPucki, supra note 2, at 103-04.
58. Nor does he deal with the cases in which firms have actually contracted for changes of
management control in the real world and have honored those contracts outside of bankruptcy.
See, e.g., Baron v. Allied Artists Pictures Corp., 337 A.2d 653 (Del. Ch. 1975).
59. It may be, for example, that the current state-created common law of contract is deficient
in the remedies it provides against recalcitrant managers and shareholders. It remains to be
explained, however, why revision of the contract law is not likely to bring about a cheaper solution than is the adoption of a bankruptcy code.
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SEARCHING UNDER THE STREETLAMP

Were Bradley and Rosenzweig satisfied that bureaucratic solutions
to commercial problems were indeed costless, they probably would
also agree with LoPucki and Warren that chapter 11, in concept at
least, is a monument to human aspirations. 60 LoPucki, on the other
hand, extravagantly concedes that, in a world of zero market costs,
chapter 11 would be a colossal mistake. 61 If I am right, the issue between those of us who rely on economic analysis to criticize bankruptcy law and those who, like LoPucki, think our work is screwball
is, as Bradley and Rosenzweig concede, 62 a question of how well our
real markets actually work. 63 The symmetrical question would be,
"Well, how well do those bureaucrats really function?" That is the
question Bradley and Rosenzweig sought to answer, and their answer
is that the bureaucrats impose a lot of costs on corporate investors. 64
Is there any reason to believe that real market costs are sufficiently
low to make them an attractive solution to the creditors' remedy problem? I believe there is. LoPucki is scathingly critical of Bradley and
Rosenzweig for their use of stock and bond market data. He accuses
them of warping the questions they study by reason of the availability
of the data, much like the person who lost his key somewhere else on
the block but conducts his search under the streetlamp because the
light is better there. 65
His critique is telling because the best evidence about whether market transaction costs are lower or higher than bankruptcy bureaucratic
costs would be whether and when firms choose one or the other route.
60. Indeed, if the world had perfect bureaucrats, the common law of property, contract, and
tort would be unnecessary. The perfect bureaucrats would simply appropriately parcel out the
world's resources to whomever would hold and use them most efficiently. There would thus
never be any need for any markets, and talking about market-based solutions to problems would
be nonsensical.
61. "It should be apparent by now that Bradley and Rosenzweig are correct in their conclusion that there is no need for court-supervised reorganization in a world without transaction
costs. A perfect market would be a perfect substitute for chapter 11; in a PM-ZTC world, chapter 11 should be repealed." LoPucki, supra note 2, at 106.
62. "The relevance or applicability of the perfect markets solution to the real world depends
on the efficiency of the pertinent real-world markets." Bradley & Rosenzweig, supra note 3, at
1054.
63. LoPucki seems willing to assume that markets actually work pretty well if doing so will
help him score a debating point. For example, LoPucki posits certain facts about how highly
leveraged the firms that Bradley and Rosenzweig studied were, and then he uses the assumption
of a well-functioning market to reinterpret their findings in a way contrary to their interpretation
of the same data. If a belief in the efficiency of the market was necessary in order to argue that
the Bradley and Rosenzweig findings were in error, LoPucki seems to have no trouble holding
the belief. See LoPucki, supra note 2, at 89.
64. This assumes that the reader is willing to accept that extended inferences are valid. See

supra Part I.A.
65. See LoPucki, supra note 2, at 85-86.
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There may be many firms which have reorganized or liquidated by
using the market, and these firms might have different characteristics
from those choosing chapter 11. Accordingly, the worthwhile cases to
study might be the cases of those firms who suffered economic hardships or serious business downturns and yet relied on their marketbased options to weather the storm. Bradley and Rosenzweig instead
limit their study to firms which chose bankruptcy because they were
easy to identify.
The firms which used the market-based techniques are hard to
identify, so I believe that LoPucki is right in charging Bradley and
Rosenzweig with looking only under the lamp. The interesting issue is
that LoPucki himself, although presumably funded by a substantial
government grant, 66 chose to search only under the same lamp. His
own empirical studies are limited to firms which chose the bureaucratic alternative. 67 It is rather remarkable that purportedly believing
only in conclusions reached through strict empirical observation, and
having studied only the bureaucratic alternative, LoPucki holds such
strong opinions about the impracticality of the other options.
LoPucki's conclusions are the inevitable consequence of his uncritical
acceptance of his Fantastic Wisconsylvania Zero-Bureaucratic-Cost
assumption. 68
My empirical hunch is that the claimholders of the firms who
chose to cope with difficulty by using the market are better off than the
claimholders of the firms that did not. I defend this hunch by observing that even believers in the ZBC hypothesis like LoPucki and Warren are not yet advocating a bureaucratic alternative to the problems
of those businesses that face the same transaction costs faced by declining businesses. People who put businesses together and make them
grow, for example, have to enter the same serially accessed markets
LoPucki and Warren decry as expensive in order to build their busi66. See id. at 86 n.22.
67. Cf. LoPucki & Whitford, supra note 20.
68. It is even plausible to suggest that the first response of firms to incipient insolvency might
not be to file a chapter 11 petition, but rather to resort to some market-based type of response to
the potential trouble, perhaps by partially liquidating their most liquid assets. Indeed, were he
not to disdain theOl'}"SO strongly, LoPucki could have cited a model which suggests that the only
assets left to be liquidated and distributed for firms undergoing financial crises are likely to be
those which trade only in markets with high transaction costs or which are highly specialized,
and thus have a lot more value to the debtor than to the markets. See Bowers, supra note 39, at
2120-28, for such a theoretical model. LoPucki dismisses that analysis as just another of those
studies using economic reasoning which are not worth examining closely, however. See LoPucki,
supra note 2, at 79 n.2. He does not point out any findings from his own studies that indicate
what managements' prebankruptcy responses were to their financial crises. Such suggestions,
even if they might have advanced his argument, would nevertheless seem unimportant to a believer in the existence of a perfect bureaucratic solution.
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nesses. How much better would be a costlessly operating central planning agency that forced all resources to be registered in a central data
bank so that the planners could direct, by fiat, those possessing assets
to deliver them to the business-builders! All those millions of contracts, which require individual negotiation and coordination and
which LoPucki and Warren say raise prospects of hopelessly high
transaction costs, have been initially negotiated and coordinated in
markets in the case of every firm ever entering chapter 11. If bureaucratic solutions are costless, it is surprising that there is no apparent
demand that they be used to replace the costly markets people use for
building businesses. No obvious a priori reason exists to believe that
there would be bureaucratic costs of putting businesses together that
are unavoidable when the bureaucratic costs of taking the structures of
businesses apart and reorganizing them are nil.
During the past seventy-five years, the efficiency of bureaucratic
solutions to the problems posed by transaction costs was extensively
experimented with throughout Eastern Europe. That experience validates hunches like mine: bureaucratic solutions are far from costless.
Markets seem to work well enough, despite their imperfections, to put
businesses together. That, it seems to me, is enough to justify my belief that markets also ought to be permitted to take them apart.

